David Hume was, and still is, a controversial Scottish Philosopher. He was born on April 26th, 1711, in Edinburgh, Scotland, and died August 25th, 1776. Although noted primarily for his innovative work in philosophy, he was not accepted kindly as a philosopher during his lifetime, and instead made a living in politics, economics, and as a historian. His History of England was for years the authoritative source on the subject. His works on philosophy span moral, religious, political, and epistemological concerns.
Basic Foundation of Hume’s Theory
David Hume sees the most fundamental fact of experience as being composed of perceptions. Furthermore, our perceptions can be further dichotomized into two categories: impressions and ideas.
Impressions, and their Source
Impressions are more forceful than ideas and can originate either externally (outward sensations) or internally (operations of the mind). External impressions can be thought of as impressions of sensation, and internal impressions as impressions of reflection. Furthermore, impressions are reducible to either simples or complexes. Simples being composed of a singularity, or one specific quality (hot), whereas complexes are composed of many qualities (fire: hot, red, orange, etc.). Lastly, no matter how complex an impression may be it is always reducible to its constituent simples.
Ideas, and their Source
Ideas are less forceful than impressions because they derive from, and are copies of impressions. So, for example, an idea of a computer comes from the initial impression of a computer. Consequently, an idea of a computer cannot exist without a corresponding impression of a computer. And when we have a particular idea of a computer it is nothing more than a reflection on that original impression. Importantly, then, ideas are not to be thought of as originals.
Furthermore, ideas are also dichotomized as simples or complexes. The idea of ‘hot’ would be considered a simple idea, whereas the idea of ‘fire’ would be defined as a complex idea because ‘fire’ generally makes us also have the ideas ‘hot’, ‘red’, ‘orange’, and whatever qualities may come to mind. Consequently, complex ideas derive from complex impressions, and simple ideas derive from simple impressions. Ultimately, though, all ideas are reducible to simple impressions. And unless original impressions are copied (reflected upon) they do not develop into ideas. They exist in a state of pre-thought.
The Limits of Thought and Imagination
An interesting consequence develops when ideas derive from impressions. All thinking uses ideas as its contents of thought, and so all thinking is confined to what it gathers through simple or complex impressions. Thought or imagination, then, can only combine ideas that it has gathered from impressions. And no matter how flexible an imagination may be, and now matter the depth of any thought, they are entirely restricted to the domain of experienced impressions.
Hume presents an example to argue his case. He says imagine a virtuous horse. Most people might consider this a ridiculous idea because it implies even a fish, or a rat, or whatever animal we imagine can also be virtuous. There is certainly nothing wrong with the thought of a virtuous horse, but we shouldn’t think of it as something authentically real because all we are doing is combining the impression of ‘virtue’ with an impression of a ‘horse’.
This argument was primarily meant to be a critique of philosophers who would develop incredibly detailed and complex systems that, when considered objectively, did not seem to refer to anything or experience from the world. Immanuel Kant, the great German philosopher, cited David Hume as the source that enabled him to break from the overly idealistic philosophies of Spinoza, Wolff, and Leibniz. Kant then went on to form one of the most famous and complex systems of philosophy, not to mention one of the most influential, as it synthesized his training in German idealism with Hume’s systematic empiricism.
References
Hume, David, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 2nd edition, edited and introduction by Eric Steinberg. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993.
